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THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONE,
THE LAW OF THE SEA, AND THE ANZUS
ALLIANCE: AN EXPLORATION OF
CONFLICTS, A STEP TOWARD
WORLD PEACE
New Zealanders have felt deepening frustration at the inability of
the States that hold nuclear weapons, in particular the two super-
powers, to agree on practical measures to halt and reverse the pro-
cess of building more and "better" nuclear weapons. If ordinary
people everywhere can see the irrationality of that race, they ask,
why cannot the superpowers see it also? And, if they can see it,
why don't they do something about it?'
Recently, the New Zealand government refused to allow United
States warships, allegedly carrying nuclear weapons, into its ports.2
In taking this action, New Zealand expressed its frustration at the
dangerous escalation of the United States and the Soviet Union's
weapons development. New Zealanders are cognizant of the super-
powers' apparent inability to resolve the conflict between the need for
national security and the threat to global survival posed by massive
build-up of nuclear weapons.3
Since 1972 New Zealand has periodically declared its territory
free of nuclear weapons.4 In 1974 the government began pressing for
a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) for the entire South Pacific
1. Address by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, David Lange, in the general debate of
the United Nations General Assembly in New York City (Sept. 26, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
Lange, U.N. General Assembly Address] (copy on file with the California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal).
2. U.S. Reiponds Sharply to New Zealand, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at 5, col. 1; U.S.
Calls off Exercise in Slap of New Zealand, id., Feb. 6, 1985, at I, col. 3; Nuclear Issue Stirs Up
Fire in New Zealanders, id., Feb. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 3. The Pentagon maintains a "long stand-
ing policy of refusing to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its ships." Id.
Feb. 10, 1985, at 13, col. 4.
3. See generally NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL (B. Boskey &
M. Willrich eds. 1970) (a useful and insightful discussion of the dynamics of nuclear
proliferation).
4. Prime Minister Lange states: "The New Zealand Labour Party has been consistent
over the years in its opposition to nuclear weapons." Address by the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, David Lange, Nuclear Policy and Sporting Contacts with South Africa, Diplomatic and
Commonwealth Writers Association in London (Sept. 28, 1984) (copy on file with the Califor-
nia Western International Law Journal). For a more complete discussion, see R. ALLEY, Nu-
CLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES: THE SOUTH PACIFIC PROPOSAL 27-29 (Stanley Foundation
Occasional Paper 14, 1977).
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region. 5
The recently elected Prime Minister of New Zealand6 has con-
tinued the policy, popular in his nation7 but unpopular in the United
5. W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL
207 (1976) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE); ALLEY, supra note 4, at 31-32.
There is considerable debate on an internationally valid definition of the concept of a Nu-
clear-Weapon-Free Zone. See Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones in All Its Aspects: Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add.I (Sales No. E.76.I.7) (1976) [hereinafter cited as CCD Special Re-
port]. Annexes II and III provide a summary of the delegates' positions on the NWFZ con-
cept. Mr. Antonio Gonzales de Leon, the Mexican delegate at the U.N. Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament in 1975, suggested this working definition:
A "nuclear-weapon-free-zone" shall be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by
the United Nations General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise
of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or agreement whereby:
(a) The status of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be
subject is defined; and
(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guaran-
tee compliance with the obligations deriving from that status.
Id. at 68, 97.
6. In the 1984 elections, David Lange defeated the incumbent Prime Minister Robert D.
Muldoon. Taft, The Kiwis Turn Dovish: New Zealand Presses for Nuclear-Free South Pacific,
L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1984, § IV at 5, col. 1.
The party platform of the Labour Party for the 1984 election states, inter alia, the
following:
Labour reaffirms its prohibition of visits by nuclear armed and/or powered warships
and/or craft in New Zealand waters. As well, it will actively seek the establishment
of a South Pacific nuclear weapons free zone and the prohibition of dumping of nu-
clear waste and testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific.
The next Labour government, in accordance with its objectives of a South Pacific
nuclear weapons free zone and its long-term desire for a nuclear free Pacific, will
continue to oppose visits to New Zealand by nuclear powered and/or armed vessels
and aircraft.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NEW ZEALAND, SPEC. BULL. ELECTION '84 POLICIES 1
(1984) (taken from the "International Law" Section of the Labour Platform) [hereinafter cited
as Election '84 Policies] (copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal).
7. Prime Minister Lange states:
I am satisfied that in implementing the policy of excluding nuclear weapons from
New Zealand the government is expressing the opinion of the majority of New Zea-
landers. This is not a flight of radical fancy. Those of you who have been to New
Zealand will know how conservative a country it is on moral and social issues. It is
that conservative country which wants to exclude nuclear weapons. We know that
we are taking a step which is serious. We know that we face opposition. We have
thought about the issues because they have been forced on our attention.
Lange, Diplomatic Writers Address, supra note 4.
As support for his statement that the government's policy of excluding nuclear-armed
warships from territorial waters is an expression of the voice of the people, the Prime Minister
cites the following facts: (1) The exclusion of nuclear weapons was challenged and made an
issue by the National Party government who received only 36% of the vote in the 1984 elec-
tion. (2) Over 90 local administrations, governing 60% of the population, have declared their
territories nuclear-free zones (NFZs). (3) After Secretary of State George Schultz' visit to New
Zealand last year and his statement that a ban on nuclear vessels was incompatible with the
Australia/New Zealand/United States defense pact, a public opinion poll was conducted. Sev-
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States,8 of declaring the country's territory free of nuclear weapons.
Following the leadership of New Zealand and Australia, in Au-
gust 1984,9 the South Pacific nations (which comprise a group called
the South Pacific Forum)' agreed on several principles as a founda-
tion for the NWFZ initiative:
(1) there would be no use, stationing, or testing of nuclear de-
vices in the South Pacific;
(2) no South Pacific nation would manufacture, acquire, or test
any nuclear explosive device;
(3) nuclear activities in the South Pacific would be conducted in
accordance with international law, particularly the Non-Proliferation
Treaty; 1
(4) the South Pacific nations would respect the principles of
navigation and overflight;' 2 and
(5) South Pacific nations would retain their unqualified sover-
eign rights to determine their own security arrangements (and such
questions as access to their ports and airfields by foreign vessels),
consistent with the purposes of a NWFZ.I3
enty-six percent of the respondents did not want nuclear weapons in New Zealand's territory.
Id. See also Mail Supports New Zealand Prime Minister, L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at 17, col. 1.
8. See supra note 2.
9. Lange, U.N. General Assembly Address, supra note 1.
10. The South Pacific Forum consists of Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Fiji, Vanuata, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu,
and Western Somoa. The Federated States of Micronesia have observer status in the Forum.
Conversation with Grant Kinnear of the New Zealand Consulate, Los Angeles (Oct. 18, 1985).
I1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty].
The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in force since March 5, 1970 and has currently
been ratified by 129 nations. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 9433, TREATIES IN FORCE 276
(1985). For a more complete discussion of the Treaty, see, SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND ORDER 209 (Library of World Affairs No. 69, 1971).
The Non-Proliferation Treaty states: "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons . . . and not in any
way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons .. " Non-Proliferation Treaty, art. I.
The Treaty further provides: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under-
takes not to receive the transfer . . . of nuclear weapons; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons . . . and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons .. " Id. art. II.
Finally, the Treaty allows for the existence of NWFZs: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the
right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories." Id. art. VII.
12. See infra notes 84-91 and 141-69 and accompanying text.
13. Lange, U.N. General Assembly Address, supra note I.
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During 1985, the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty was drafted. On
August 6, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima,
the States of the South Pacific Forum met in Rarotonga, in the Cook
Islands, for their annual convocation. At that time the drafted
NWFZ Treaty was presented for signature. Eight of the thirteen
Member States signed the Treaty.'"
The Treaty prohibits the testing and stationing of nuclear weap-
ons, the exporting of nuclear material without adherence to strict
safeguards, and the "manufacturing, acquiring or receiving from
others any nuclear explosive device."'" It also creates a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone which extends from Australia to South America
and from the Equator to Antarctica.
16
The main issue presented by the adoption of the South Pacific
14. South Pacific Countries Sign an Antinuclear Pact, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1985, at A4,
col. I. The Treaty is of course only in effect for those Member States who have signed and
ratified it.
As this Comment goes to press, the Treaty has been signed (subject to ratification) by
representatives of the Governments of New Zealand, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,
Niue, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. Article 15 of the Treaty provides that the Treaty will not
enter into force until eight instruments of ratification have been deposited. South Pacific Nu-
clear Free Zone Treaty and Draft Protocols (Aug. 1985) [hereinafter cited as South Pacific
NWFZ Treaty]. (Copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal.)
15. See supra note 14; Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. F.D. O'Flynn, states
as follows:
The Minister described the Treaty as containing a preamble, sixteen articles and four
annexes. Under its terms, the parties to the treaty pledge to each other not to possess,
manufacture, or acquire nuclear explosive devices anywhere. They pledge to prevent
the testing of nuclear explosive devices in their territory and not to allow the station-
ing of nuclear explosive devices in their territories. They agree to take measures to
prevent the diversion of fissionable material to non-peaceful purposes, and not to
dump radioactive waste in the zone.
Press release issued by Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 7, 1985 [hereinafter cited as
Press Release of Aug. 7, 1985] (copy on file with the California Western International Law
Journal.)
16. South Pacific Countries Sign an Antinuclear Pact, supra note 14; South Pacific NWFZ
Treaty, supra note 15, Annex 1, at 8. The preamble to the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty states
as follows:
The Parties to this Treaty
UNITED in their commitment to a world at peace;
GRAVELY CONCERNED that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk
of nulcear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;
CONVINCED that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve
the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind
and the threat which they pose to life on earth;
BELIEVING that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts
to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in
the region and the common security of all;
DETERMINED to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and
beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples
and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;
REAFFIRMING the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
4
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NWFZ is whether it will be a viable and effective security arrange-
ment. To be effective, the Treaty can neither (a) contravene peremp-
tory norms of international law, 7 nor (b) conflict with the present
international legal obligations of the Parties.' I It is reasonable to as-
Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contribut-
ing to world security;
NOTING in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognises the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories;
NOTING that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear
weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof apply in the South Pacific;
NOTING also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmos-
phere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water applies in the South Pacific;
DETERMINED to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive
wastes and other radioactive matter;
GUIDED by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a
nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportu-
nity in accordance with the principles set out in the communique of that meeting;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
17. The Vienna Convention outlines the limits of treaty obligations in Article 53.
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, re-
printed in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
See also Dhokalia, Problems Relating to Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties, ESSAYS ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 149-177 (S.K. Agrawala ed. 1972); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note I1, at
27-57.
18. The United Nations Charter states as follows:
In the event of a confict between obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agree-
ment, their obligation under the present Charter shall prevail.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103. The obligations established by the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty are
compatible with and indeed fulfill obligations under the U.N. Charter. See infra note 75.
Subject to Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties determines the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject
matter. It states in pertinent part:
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty
prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier
treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the
later treaty.
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sume that the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty would not conflict with
any peremptory norm of international law.
The multilateral treaty establishing the South Pacific NWFZ is
the primary basis in international law for the Zone. 9 Obligations set
by this Treaty may conflict with its signatories' other international
legal obligations. The purpose of this Comment is to examine the
potentiality of those conflicts and offer solutions to those conflicts
that exist.
This Comment will first outline the history of the NWFZ con-
cept to provide perspective. Next, it will examine potential conflicts
between obligations under the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty and other
international legal obligations created by accession to the Third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111)20
and the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in para-
graph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights
and obligations.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 17, art. 103, paras. 2-4.
Professor Fenwick states:
Law between nations, as between the citizens of the more highly developed states,
performs a twofold function. In the first place it determines the legal relation of states
to the community of which they are members and their respective relations to one
another within that community. . . .In the second place international law performs
the function of promoting common interests, in respect to which there is not so much
a conflict of rights as a need of cooperative action to bring about an orderly regulation
of matters of mutual benefit to all. This second function of international law has been
of relatively late manifestation; but having once more come into being it has grown
with striking rapidity and has within recent years come to occupy a significant place
in the foreign relations of states, paralleling the adjustment of mutual rights and
duties.
C. G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (4th ed. 1965).
19. "[M]ulti-partite treaties are now the primary instruments of the development of inter-
national law." FENWICK, supra note 18, at 96. For a more complete discussion, see id. at 94-
95, 514-17; C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28, 34
(1965); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 11, at 27-57.
20. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, April 20, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122 [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III], reprinted in K.R. SIMMONDS, U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1983). Over 150 nations have signed the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, only 13 have ratified it. The United States, Britain, France
and Japan are not ratifying the treaty primarily because of disputes over the treaty's codifica-
tion of seabed mining rights. The United States, Argentina and Turkey have openly declared
that they will not sign the Convention. The Soviet Union has signed, but may not ratify if the
principles provided in the Convention become customary law. Platzoeder, Who Will Ratify the
Convention? 17 L. SEA INST. PROC. 662-67 (1984); telephone conversations with Frank Simp-
son, Manager, Ocean Mining Exploration Division of Lockheed Advanced Marine Systems
(Oct. 1984 and Feb. 1985).
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United States (ANZUS). 21 Finally, this Comment will advance pro-
posals to enhance the effectiveness of the NWFZ Treaty and to
render the South Pacific NWFZ a viable and effective arrangement.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NWFZ CONCEPT
After World War II, policymakers developed at least two differ-
ent approaches to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons: (1) the creation of NWFZs in which all nuclear
weapons would be prohibited; and (2) the enactment of a treaty that
would ban the dissemination and acquisition of nuclear weapons. 2
The second approach was accomplished by the Non-Proliferation
Treaty of 1968.23 The first approach has been manifested by several
treaties establishing NWFZs, one of which is the Treaty of
Tlatelolco 24 which established Latin America as a NWFZ. The new
South Pacific NWFZ manifests the influence of both approaches.
Several proposals in the recent past have been advanced to establish
NWFZs.
A. Proposals to Establish NWFZs
One of the first proposals to establish a NWFZ took place in
1956. The Soviet Union introduced a plan to the Sub-Committee of
the United Nations Disarmament Commission to prohibit the sta-
tioning of nuclear military formations and the locating of nuclear or
hydrogen weapons of any kind in Central Europe.25 One year later,
the Polish foreign minister also proposed the creation of a NWFZ in
Central Europe.26 According to his program (known as the Rapacki
21. Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Sept. 1, 1951,
3 U.S.T. 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493, 131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter cited as ANZUS].
22. Epstein, Nuclear-Free Zones, 233 Sci. AM. 25 (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ep-
stein, Sci. AM.]; W. EPSTEIN, A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN AFRICA? 5 (Stanley Foun-
dation Occasional Paper 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as EPSTEIN, AFRICA].
These two approaches were in addition to a ban on nuclear weapons tests, which was also
designed to aid in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Id. at 6; Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T.
1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963). Under the Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, all nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under the control or
jurisdiction of the contracting parties "in the atmosphere and beyond its limits, including outer
space and underground, including territorial water or high seas are prohibited." Id. at art.
I(G); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note i1, at 215.
23. See supra note 11.
24. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Tlatelolco).
25. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 19.
26. Id.; EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 55, 208. The Rapacki Plan was named
Vol. 16
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Plan) Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany would
be declared NWFZs. The plan provided for a system of verification
and recognition of nuclear-weapon-free status by other States.27
Western powers objected to the Rapacki Plan on several grounds
centered around the complex political and strategic issues involved.2"
To meet the objections, the plan was revised twice; however, the di-
vergent positions could not be reconciled.29
In 1959 Ireland proposed a plan to the UN General Assembly to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly in Central
for Adam Rapacki, the Foreign Minister of Poland who proposed the plan. On October 2,
1957, at the 12th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Poland indicated its
readiness to "impose a ban on the production and stockpiling of nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons in its territory," contingent upon a similar agreement on the part of the two German
States. On the same day, Czechoslovakia joined in the Polish proposal. On October 4, 1957,
the German Democratic Republic expressed its support and on October 10, the Soviet Union
did likewise.
The Rapacki Plan was published on February 14, 1958. It provided, inter alia, that the
States located in the NWFZ would "undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain or
possess nuclear weapons of any type and not to permit the installation on their territories of
such weapons." CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 20-21.
27. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 208-09. The plan provided for France, the
Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom to undertake the following
obligations:
(a) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in their armed forces stationed in territories of
the States of the zone and neither to maintain nor install in those territories any
installations for servicing nuclear weapons, including missile-launching equipment;
(b) Not to transfer those weapons or equipment to the States of the zone;
(c) Not to use nuclear weapons against the zone.
CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 21.
The Rapacki Plan also provided for an elaborate system of control, including ground and
aerial reconnaissance and the creation of a supervisory body open to participation by NATO
and Warsaw Pact representatives and others. Id.
28. Epstein outlined several of the problems.
The plan was unacceptable to the Western powers, who regarded it as an attempt to
weaken their military and political position in Central Europe, since it contained no
limitations on conventional arms and forces and would, in effect, amount to a form of
recognition of East Germany, which the Western powers were not willing to give at
that time, as they were pressing for a unified Germany.
EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 209.
29. In response to objections, Rapacki submitted a revised version of the plan on Novem-
ber 4, 1958, proposing its implementation in two phases: (I) a freeze on nuclear armaments in
the proposed zone; and (2) a reduction of conventional forces to occur simultaneously with a
complete denuclearization of the zone. Poland submitted a third version in 1962, to the 18-
nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. This revised plan would have been open to any
European State that wanted to accede to the plan. Id.; CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at
22.
Epstein points out: "The Western powers remained opposed to all three versions of the
Rapacki Plan on the ground that they were intended to reduce Western nuclear strength in
Europe and would give the Soviet Union a military advantage because of its superiority in
conventional arms and forces." W. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 209.
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Europe.a° Today, work on a NWFZ in Central Europe is still going
forward. On June 14, 1983, the Prime Minister of Sweden formally
requested support for a NWFZ in Scandinavia and Central Europe. a"
World leaders have advocated the military denuclearization of
the Balkan Peninsula since 1957.32 Greece and Rumania have
agreed on the most recent proposal to establish a Balkan NWFZ.3
The African nations have been working to set up a NWFZ in
their region since 1960, the year of the first nuclear test explosion by
France in the Sahara Desert.34 In 1965 the UN General Assembly
endorsed the "Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,"
adopted by the Organization of African Unity.35 However, two of
the most powerful African nations, South Africa and Egypt, are not
currently participating in the work to establish Africa as a NWFZ.36
30. During the general debate at the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Ireland
proposed that the non-nuclear weapon States in a given area "would undertake, first, not to
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and secondly,
to subject themselves to United Nations inspections to ensure that they were keeping to that
agreement." In exchange, "the nuclear weapon States and all members of the United Nations
would undertake in advance, by specific engagements, to assist the members of the area, in case
of attack, by means of a standing United Nations force." CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at
19-20.
31. The Prime Minister of Sweden, Olaf Palme, made this request in a speech before the
North Atlantic Assembly. He was the first non-NATO leader ever to address the Assembly.
Wall St. J., June 14, 1983, at A6, col. 3.
In 1961 at the 16th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Sweden had suggested another
approach toward establishing a non-specific NWFZ. Sweden proposed that the Secretary-Gen-
eral conduct an inquiry into the conditions under which a non-nuclear country would be will-
ing to agree to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons and to refuse to
receive on their territory such weapons in the future on behalf of any other country. The
Swedish proposal was approved by the General Assembly in Resolution 1664 (XVI) on Decem-
ber 4, 1961. The Secretary-General conducted the inquiry and received replies from 62 mem-
ber States. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 20.
32. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 22-23.
33. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreau made this proposal at a Balkan Conference on
the NWFZ concept. Western analysts objected that "formation of a nuclear-free zone would
suit the policies of the Soviet Union without compelling Moscow to make any parallel conces-
sions." N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1982, at L3.
34. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 23. France later shifted its nuclear testing from
Algeria to the South Pacific island of Mururoa and then, after repeated formal protests from
South Pacific nations, to an underground area. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 210;
See also Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Judgment of Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
35. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 24; EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at
209-1I. For a complete history of the efforts to create an African NWFZ, see EPSTEIN, AF-
RICA, supra note 22, at 10-12. For a text of the resolution entitled "Implementation of the
Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" (G.A. Resolution A/Res. 31/69, adopted Dec.
10, 1976), see id. at 25.
36. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 214-16. Because of its apartheid policy and
its refusal to grant independence to Namibia (Southwest Africa), most African states boycott
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In 1974 the UN General Assembly adopted an Ira-
nian/Egyptian draft to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East.3 7
While Israel abstained, all nuclear-weapon-free States, some main-
taining reservations, voted for the draft.38 Even though Israel has
announced support in principle for a Middle Eastern NWFZ, the
traditional Israeli/Arab antagonism has so far prevented substantial
agreement.39
Also in 1974 Pakistan proposed the creation of a South Asian
NWFZ.4° At that time, the five nuclear States in the area expressed
their acceptance of the South Asian NWFZ concept. 4'
In 1971 the UN General Assembly declared that the Indian
Ocean was thenceforth designated as a "zone of peace."' 42  The
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France
have repeatedly abstained from voting in favor of an Indian Ocean
peace zone.4 3 Negotiations on such a zone are aimed at the military
denuclearization of the Indian Ocean itself," a concept which raises
South Africa and do not communicate with the country. In addition, Egypt will not agree to
an African NWFZ unless Israel does so as well. Epstein points out that "while it is quite
possible and feasible to establish a nuclear-free zone in Africa without the participation of
South Africa and Egypt, there is little sense of urgency about doing so and hence not much
impetus in this regard." Id. at 210-11. Also, Egypt could be regarded as a Middle Eastern,
rather than an African, state; it would have the option of joining either a Middle Eastern or an
African NWFZ or both, were either region to take the initiative.
37. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 26.
38. Id.; EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 214-15. China, France and the Soviet
Union voted for the draft, with reservations on the provisions referring to certain treaties. The
United States expressed its doubts about the part of the resolution which "urged States in the
region to undertake certain commitments in advance of actual negotiations and the conclusion
of an agreement." Israel explained its abstention by holding that the best way to establish a
NWFZ was by direct consultations between the regional States rather than, as Iran and Egypt
suggested, by preliminary negotiations between the Secretary-General and the regional States.
CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 26.
39. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 215. Epstein suggests that Israel's willingess
to become a party to a NWFZ in the Middle East could become a cornerstone of settlement
between Israel and the Arab States.
40. Id. at 215-16; CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 27-28.
41. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 27. The five nuclear States with interests in the
area are China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. E'-
STEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 215.
42. Epstein points out that the concept of a "peace zone" is more expansive than that of a
NWFZ. The concept is supported by almost all of the littoral States around the Indian Ocean.
The declaration of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone goes beyond denuclearization and would
be tantamount to a requirement of demilitarization. China and India have already voted in
favor of such a zone. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 216.
43. The reason for abstention by the four nuclear powers is not known. Two years after
the declaration the U.N. General Assembly urged all States to accept the principles and goals
of the declaration, but these four powers continued to withhold their support. Id. at 216-17.
44. Id. at 217.
10
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issues similar to those raised by the South Pacific NWFZ.
Some proposals have gone beyond the conceptual level and have
led to creation of nuclear-weapon-free legal status through the con-
crete process of treaty enactment.
B. Treaties Establishing NWFZs
1. The Antarctic Treaty. The first multi-lateral agreement to
set up a NWFZ was the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 4" This Treaty was
established to ensure the use of Antarctica "for peaceful purposes
only"46 and thus designated the continent as a demilitarized zone
which, by implication, renders the region nuclear-weapon-free. 47
The Treaty provisions do not extend the Zone to the high seas of the
area.
48
2. The Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America or the Treaty of Tlatelolco estab-
lished the first NWFZ in a populated area.49 The Latin-American
Zone now protects about 7.5 million square miles and some 200 mil-
lion people.50
The Treaty of Tlatelolco also was the first agreement in arms
limitation and disarmament to establish an effective system of control
45. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 10. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12
U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 72.
46. The Treaty provides: "I. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There
shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of
any type of weapon." The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 45, art. I.
47. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 10. The New Zealand government is "fully
committed to, and will defend vigorously, the Antarctic Treaty which demilitarized a whole
continent to the south of New Zealand and prohibited the basing or testing of nuclear weapons
and which, for more than 20 years, has effectively guaranteed the stability of the region."
Lange, U.N. General Assembly Address, supra note I, at 18.
48. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 45, art. VI.
49. EPSTEIN, AFRICA, supra note 22, at 9; THE STANLEY FOUNDATION, VANTAGE CON-
FERENCE REPORT: NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES 12 (Oct. 7-9, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
NWFZ REPORT].
50. EPSTEIN, AFRICA, supra note 22, at 9. "What is more important," Epstein comments,
"the number of its parties and supporters, including the nuclear signatories of the Protocols,
keeps growing year by year. Such potential nuclear powers as Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia
and Peru are full parties." Id. See also EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 212; CCD
Special Report, supra note 5, at 13. For a complete discussion of this topic, see A. GARCIA
ROBLES, THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA (Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1967); A. GARCIA ROBLES, THE LATIN-AMERICAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE
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and verification of compliance.5
This Treaty prohibits the "development or production, as well
as the receipt or installation, of nuclear weapons by a Latin Ameri-
can Country." 2 In addition, the parties pledge not to permit the
deployment of such weapons on their territory. 5" Furthermore, the
Latin American parties are required to submit their nuclear power
facilities to safeguards set by the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
54
The Treaty of Tlatelolco defines "nuclear weapon" as "any de-
vice which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate
for use for warlike purposes.""5 The Treaty further provides that all
nuclear materials and facilities are restricted to "exclusively" peace-
ful purposes. 6 One separate document (Protocol I) obligates the for-
51. NWFZ REPORT, supra note 49, at 12-13.
52. Id. at 12. The Treaty states:
1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to
prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:
(a) the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means what-
soever of any nuclear weapons by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on
behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and
(b) the receipt, storage, testing, installation, deployment and any form of posses-
sion of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by any-
one on their behalf or in any other way.
2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging,
or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any other way participating in the testing,
use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 24, art. 1.
53. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 24. NWFZ REPORT, supra note 49, at 12.
54. NWFZ REPORT, supra note 49, at 12. The International Atomic Energy Agency
[hereinafter cited as IAEA] is an organization developed as a result of President Eisenhower's
"Atoms for Peace" proposal in 1953 to permit and facilitate the international allocation of
fissionable material. The Statute of the IAEA entered into force on July 29, 1957. EPSTEIN,
LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 13-14.
IAEA operates under the aegis of the United Nations but is not one of its Specialized
Agencies. . . . IAEA is authorized to establish and administer safeguards which are
designed to ensure that materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information it
makes available are "not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." At
the request of the parties, IAEA may also apply safeguards to any bilateral or multi-
lateral arrangement or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the
field of nuclear energy.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note II, at 208.
55. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 24, art. 5. The Treaty's definition of "nuclear
weapon" continues: "An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the
device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible
part thereof." Id.
56. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 24, art. 17. See also EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE,
supra note 5, at 212; ROBLES, LATIN-AMERICAN NWFZ, supra note 50, at 27. Restricting
nuclear power to use for "peaceful purposes" is a basic element of a NWFZ agreement. How-
ever, the construction of that phrase raises many practical issues. For example, the question of
12
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eign States that are responsible for territories within the Zone to
apply the Treaty in those territories.57 An additional document (Pro-
tocol II) provides for nuclear-weapon States to undertake to observe
the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Zone and not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against the States in the Zone.58 In addition
to being the first NWFZ in the world that covers a populated region,
the Treaty of Tlatelolco serves as a working model for the South Pa-
cific NWFZ Treaty, as well as a precedent for practical application of
the Zone.59
3. The Outer Space Treaty. Originating in two resolutions
adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly, the Outer Space
Treaty was signed in 1967.' The parties to the Treaty have under-
taken "not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
peaceful nuclear explosions has been a source of controversy in the Latin American NWFZ
and represents "one of the most difficult and complex obstacles to the full success of the Latin
American zone." NWFZ REPORT, supra note 49, at 13. "The majority view is that, under
current technology, such explosions are banned." EPSTEIN, AFRICA, supra note 22, at 8.
57. Protocol I provides for the extension of nuclear-weapon-free status to certain territo-
ries within the Treaty's zone of application which are, dejure or defacto, under the jurisdiction
of States outside the Zone. The effect of this Protocol is to confine the system of control with
regard to those territories to the application of the IAEA safeguards. Protocol I has been
ratified by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The United States has declared that
neither the Virgin Islands nor Puerto Rico could be included in the Latin American NWFZ,
while the Panama Canal Zone could be included, provided the rights of transit were preserved.
France has declared that no part of its territory could be given nuclear-weapon-free status.
CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 14. For the complete text of Protocol I, see ROBLES,
LATIN AMERICAN NWFZ, supra note 50, at 30-31.
58. During the drafting of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, an important condition for the effec-
tiveness of the NWFZ was a clear commitment by the nuclear weapon States to respect the
nuclear-weapon-free status of the Zone. Protocol II embodies this condition. Under this Pro-
tocol, nuclear weapon States agree to respect fully the "statute of denuclearization of Latin
America for warlike purposes as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty" and "not to
contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of
article I of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies." Moreover, nuclear
weapon States undertake the duty to forbear the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons
against any party to the Treaty. China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
have so far accepted Protocol II. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 15-18. France has
since moved away from its earlier declaration and has ratified Protocol I. The Soviet Union
has also ratified Protocol II. Argentina and Brazil, who have not ratified the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, have announced their intent to ratify the Treaty. ROBLES, LATIN AMERICAN NWFZ,
supra note 50, at 7-8.
59. Epstein, Sci. AM., supra note 22, at 28; THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DIS-
ARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COMMON SECURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 168
(1982); THE STANLEY FOUNDATION, VANTAGE CONFERENCE REPORT, CONFERENCE ON
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND WORLD ORDER (1974). See also NWFZ REPORT, supra
note 49, at 12-15.
60. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
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nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner. ' , 6 1  As a result, the Outer Space
Treaty establishes outer space and the celestial bodies as NWFZs.62
4. The Seabed Treaty. In 1969 the Soviet Union submitted to
the Conference of the UN Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty
which prohibited the use of the seabed and ocean floor for military
purposes including the emplacement of nuclear weapons. 63  This
draft led to the Seabed Treaty, which entered into force on May 18,
19 7 2 .64 The main provision sets forth:
The State Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or em-
place on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof
beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in article II,
any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass de-
struction as well as structures, launching installations or any other
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such
weapons.65
At the urging of coastal non-nuclear States, the United States and the
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter cited as The Outer Space Treaty]. CCD Special
Report, supra note 5, at 12; SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 11, at 208.
61. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV. In addition, the Treaty contains:
(a) A prohibition of all military activity on the Moon and other celestial bodies, in-
cluding the establishment of military bases, installations, and fortifications, the testing
of any type of weapons and the conduct of military personnel in scientific research or
for other peaceful purposes, as well as the use of equipment necessary for peaceful
exploration (art. IV); and
(b) A provision that all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the
Moon and other celestial bodies would be open to representatives of States parties "on
a basis of reciprocity" (art. XII).
CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 12. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 11, at 208.
62. However, two nuclear weapon States (France and China) are not parties to the Outer
Space Treaty. Moreover, any Party to the Treaty may give notice of withdrawal from obliga-
tion, one year after entry into force of the Treaty. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. XVI.
As of June 1975, the Treaty was in force for 71 States, and another 35 States had signed it.
CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 12.
63. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 18. In 1968 the U.N. General Assembly indi-
cated widespread support for the "principle of reserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond
the territorial waters exclusively for peaceful purposes." Id.
64. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. i1, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 995 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter cited as Seabed Treaty]. For a discus-
sion of the background of the Treaty, see EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5. at 187.
65. Seabed Treaty, supra note 64, art. I, I. The established NWFZ does not extend to
the seabed beneath a coastal State's territorial waters. Article 1I of the Treaty states that the
outer limit of the seabed NWFZ should be coterminous with the 12-mile outer limit of the
territorial sea, established in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contigu-
ous Zone. Verification procedures are outlined in Article III. CCD Special Report, supra note
5, at 18-19.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss1/13
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Soviet Union agreed to several revisions, including an amendment
which provides that the Parties "undertake to continue negotiations
in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament
for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and
the subsoil thereof.",
66
The NWFZs established by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the Seabed Treaty of 1971 were
created by the world community primarily to regulate use of these
"unexplored, unexploited and uninhabitable environments." '67  Un-
like these treaties, in which arms limitations aspects were secondary,
the Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first NWFZ created specifi-
cally to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.68
The establishment of the South Pacific NWFZ has been moti-
vated by a desire to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and by
the fundamental concerns of regional security and global survival.69
The primary basis of the Zone in international law is the multi-
lateral treaty which creates a nuclear-weapon-free regional arrange-
ment by the mutual consent of the States involved. 0 Additional
legal bases7' are: UN Declarations supporting the South Pacific pro-
66. Seabed Treaty, supra note 64, art. V. Observers point out that "no negotiations what-
soever, in good faith or otherwise, have taken place in pursuance of the commitment made in
Article V." EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 188.
67. Epstein, Sci. AM., supra note 22, at 27.
68. Id.
69. ALLEY, supra note 4, at 40-42. Concern about being a target of nuclear attack by
having such weapons traverse the region and about the danger of massive annihilation and
destruction which increases in proportion to the presence of more weapons in the area has
motivated the South Pacific nations to draft a treaty excluding nuclear weapons from the area.
Also, however, "for small Oceanic states, an attack on nuclear weapons is part of a broader
spectrum of common interests anxious to prevent a cancerous proliferation of powerful exter-
nal technologies-whatever their form and source---from irreparably harming island environ-
ments and lifestyles." Id. at 40. See also Lange, U.N. General Assembly Address, supra note
I.
70. See supra note 14. Professor Corbett states: "The basis of international law as a sys-
tem and of the rules of which it is composed is the consent of States." C. PARRY, THE
SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965) quoting Corbett, The Consent of
States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 29-30 (1925). Thus, the
true basis in international law of the NWFZ is the consent of the States involved in its
operation.
71. The legal bases of international law are codified in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice and include:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
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posal," the customary right of self-defense,7 a the principle of territo-
rial sovereignty,74 the UN Charter,75 the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
7 6
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153.
The structure of Article 38 implies that treaty and custom can be different sources leading
to different interpretations. Usually, both of these "recognized manifestations" of international
law are simultaneously relevant as evidence of the law pertaining to a subject. Gamble, The
Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 305, 307-14 (1981).
72. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3477 endorsed, by a vote of 110 in
favor, none against and 20 abstentions (inter alia, Cuba, Egypt, France, USSR, United King-
dom, United States), the establishment of a NWFZ in the South Pacific on December 11, 1975.
ALLEY, supra note 4, at 50. However, General Assembly Resolutions do not have binding
force as primary legal authority.
73. FENWICK, supra note 18, at 275-85. The underlying principle, as Elihu Root stated, is
"the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which
it will be too late to protect itself." He also stated, "It is well understood, that the exercise of
the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend beyond the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of the state exercising it." Id., at 275, quoting 8 AM. J. 427 (1914). See also I.
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 214-350 (1963).
74. The rule of territorial sovereignty may be stated as follows:
It is believed that the proposition is unquestionable that under international law every
nation may prohibit the introduction into its territory of any commodity which it sees
fit to exclude.
JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 219 (1927)
quoted in McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 66 (1962).
The "territory' of a coastal State extends, within varying limits, into the seas surrounding
that State. Moreover, every valid foreign policy goal assumes the inviolable integrity of the
national territory. A nation maintains territorial supremacy only to the extent that this
supremacy is respected by other nations and is limited by international law or treaty. G.
SMITH, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF FREE SEAS 20 (1980). Articles 2 and 3 of UNCLOS
III, supra note 20, specifically outline the legal status of the territorial sea, its breadth, and how
it is measured.
75. The U.N. Charter is consistent with and supports the formation of NWFZs. In par-
ticular, Article I of the Charter provides that States "take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace. . . to develop friendly relations among nations
• . . and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace" (emphasis added).
The existence and deployment of nuclear weapons is an existing threat to world peace and
global survival, as expressed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note I1, and the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 24.
The creation of the South Pacific NWFZ is also consistent with Article 52 of the U.N.
Charter, which envisions regional arrangements for dealing with matters concerning the preser-
vation of international peace that are appropriate for regional action. See CCD Special Report,
supra note 5, at 48-51.
76. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 11, art. VII. The establishment of the NWFZ is
at least implicitly supported by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would be in furtherance of
the same objectives. EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 322-23; Epstein, Sci. AM.,
supra note 22, at 35. For a broader view of the history and effect of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, see NEGOTIATING SECURITY: AN ARMS CONTROL READER, 142 (The Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1979); W. EPSTEIN, RETROSPECTIVE ON THE NPT REVIEW
CONFERENCE: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE (The Stanley Foundation Occasional Paper 9,
1975); The Stanley Foundation, VANTAGE CONFERENCE REPORT, NON-PROLIFERATION:
1980's (Jan. 29-Feb. 3, 1980); M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK
16
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and the argument for the international illegality of nuclear
weapons."
Of crucial importance to the success of the South Pacific NWFZ
FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (1969); L. DUNN, CONTROLLING THE BOMB: NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION IN THE 1980's (1982); and III THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OR-
DER: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971).
77. An analysis of the major conventions establishing the law of armed conflict makes it
clear that the use of strategic nuclear weapons is illegal under international law. Those conven-
tions listed infra prohibit weapons which cause unnecessary suffering and slow death, weapons
which violate neutral territory, and weapons which kill civilians and non-civilians indiscrimi-
nately. Like the use of biologic and chemical weapons, the use of nuclear weapons produces
these results (through radioactive fallout and massive destruction by fire and genetic altera-
tion). The use of nuclear weapons is therefore prohibited under international law, according to
the major conventions addressing the law of armed conflict. In addition, customary principles
have emerged from these conventions which bind non-signatories. See The Hague Convention,
Oct. 18, 1907, War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631; The Hague Convention,
Oct. 18, 1907, Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. 545, 1
Bevans 723; Treaty of Peace with Germany (Versaille Treaty), June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43;
Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 6, 1922,
reprinted in 16, AM. J. INT'L L. pp. 187-189; Geneva Protocol on Poison Gas and Bacteriologi-
cal Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No. 8061; Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1555, E.A.S. 472; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in G.A. Res. 2670, 3 U.N. GAOR Pt. 1 at 174, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948));
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Agreement on Measures to Reduce
the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the U.S. and the USSR, Sept. 30, 1972, 22
U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 87; Geneva Protocol on Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflict, Aug. 15, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144. See also G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (The Library of World Affairs
No. 43 1958). N. SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPO-
RARY PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1971); Q. WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR (1961); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra
note II, at 185-219.
Since an international judicial ruling on illegality would be unenforceable, the major pur-
pose of an agreement for the illegality per se of nuclear weapons under international law is to
consolidate international and national public opinion against a government's possession of such
weapons for national defense.
The author of this Comment offers the following jurisprudential argument for the illegality
of the possession of nuclear weapons:
I. (A) A court of law finds a particular activity illegal in order to uphold certain values
of society (for example, to steal is illegal because of the societal value of property ownership; to
murder is illegal because of the value society places on human life);
(B) The highest value of mankind (common to all societies) is survival;
(C) The use of any weapon which maims, causes slow death, pervasively destroys the
natural environment on which all people depend for life, and kills civilian and non-civilians
indiscriminately is contrary to survival, the highest value of mankind;
(D) The use of nuclear weapons produces such results;
(E) Therefore, the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the highest value of mankind.
To hold the use of nuclear weapons as illegal is to uphold the highest value of international
society, that of survival.
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is the support of nuclear States conducting military exercises in the
region, most notably the United States and the Soviet Union.78
Without this support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Zone
and the legal obligations undertaken by the Parties creating the Zone,
the South Pacific NWFZ will be very difficult to implement.79
The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, in a press
release concerning the Treaty, that the signatories have taken care
not to create obligations which conflict with other international legal
obligations.8 0 However, there is still potential for such conflict. This
Comment will next examine the potential for conflict between the
NWFZ Treaty and the existing international obligations of its signa-
tories, incurred by accession to UNCLOS III and ANZUS. Modifi-
cations will then be proposed to render the South Pacific NWFZ a
more effective arrangement.
II. POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS
ESTABLISHED BY THE SOUTH PACIFIC NWFZ TREATY
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS OF ITS PARTIES
Potential conflict exists between legal obligations established by
the Treaty creating a South Pacific NWFZ8 t and the international
II. (A) Inherent in the development of a weapon is the intent to use it;
(B) If the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, then the intent to use such weapons plus
an act in furtherance of that intent is illegal;
(C) Therefore, any nation who possesses a nuclear weapon and who has also devel-
oped that weapon is engaged in an illegal act.
78. Commenting on the 1975 meeting of the South Pacific Forum at which regional sup-
port for a South Pacific NWFZ was first generated, Roderic Alley points out:
[T]he actual outlines of any future South Pacific NWFZ were never clearly spelled
out by any of the governments directly concerned. Left unstated were: the geographi-
cal scope of any South Pacific NWFZ; identification of key concepts (for example,
what is a nuclear weapon?); institutional structure; inspection procedures; working
plans for treaty formulation; target dates for implementation; and, what is perhaps
one of the most important NWFZ questions of all, the obligations expected of existing
nuclear weapon powers towards any future treaty.
ALLEY, supra note 4, at 29.
79. Id. at 36-49. According to Roderic Alley, critics of the South Pacific NWFZ would
argue that the "zonal agreement would be most easily maintained where it was least likely to be
breached, while it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce when enforcement would be
most needed." ALLEY, supra note 4, at 36.
80. Press release by the Acting Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. F.D. O'Flynn.
(Copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal.)
81. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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legal obligations of the Parties established by UNCLOS 1112 and
ANZUS. 3
Because neither the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty nor UNCLOS
III have entered into force, the obligation, of the Parties under these
conventions are potential. However, for the sake of analysis, this
Comment will treat these obligations as actual and will illustrate the
points at which the South Pacific Parties' obligations under the
NWFZ Treaty could conflict with obligations established by UN-
CLOS III and ANZUS.
A. UNCLOS III
UNCLOS III was first opened for signature on April 20, 1982.
Fiji, a member of the South Pacific Forum which drafted the new
NWFZ Treaty, was the first State in the world to ratify the Conven-
tion on December 10, 1982. Thirteen States have so far ratified UN-
CLOS III. Sixty States must do so for the Convention to enter into
force.8 4 All South Pacific Forum Member States are signatories to
UNCLOS III, and most are Parties. 5
UNCLOS III establishes three categories of ocean space: (1) the
territorial seas (up to 12 miles from shore); 6 (2) the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (up to 200 miles from shore),8 7 and (3) the high seas
(beyond 200 miles from shore).88
The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the
South Pacific NWFZ Treaty, signed by eight Forum States on Au-
gust 6, 1985, "will go a long way to remove the spectre of the nuclear
threat from the South Pacific.",8 9 There are two important provisions
of the new Treaty.
The Treaty does not interfere in any way with the right of each
Party to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships
and aircraft to its ports and airfields. Nor does it interfere with the
82. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text. See also, Lee, The New Law of the Sea
and the Pacific Basin, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 247 (1983).
On December 10, 1982, Fiji became the first State in the world to ratify UNCLOS III.
Other South Pacific parties include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu,
Nauru, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Samoa and the Cook Islands. These states were original
signatories in December 1982. SIMMONDS, supra note 20, at xxii, xxv-xxx.
83. See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 97 and supra note 20.
85. See supra note 82.
86. See infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 152-68 and accompanying text.
89. Press Release of Aug. 7, 1985, supra note 15.
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freedoms of navigation guaranteed by international law to such
ships and aircraft.9'
The NWFZ established by the Treaty "extends in the West from the
West Coast of Australia to the boundary of the Latin American Zone
in the East, from the equator in the north to 60 degrees south, where
the Antarctic Treaty already establishes a completely demilitarized
zone covering the whole continent."'" The Treaty of August 6,
1985, establishes the largest NWFZ on the planet and covers popu-
lated regions as well as extraterritorial ocean space.
For the purpose of analysis, the two most important provisions
of this Treaty, as publicized by the New Zealand Minister of Foreign
Affairs, are the terms of non-interference with the rights of sovereign
Member States to decide policy on allowance of nuclear-armed war-
ships into territorial waters and the terms of non-intervention with
"the freedom of navigation guaranteed by international law" to ships
and aircraft. These two provisions raise the question of whether the
South Pacific NWFZ will have any effect. These provisions also raise
issues of conflict with obligations already established by accession to
UNCLOS III. One such obligation is the duty to observe the right of
innocent passage through territorial water.
UNCLOS III guarantees the "right of innocent passage"
through territorial waters.9 2 Innocent passage of a foreign ship is
defined as passage which "is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State." 93 (Islands are accorded the same
rights and obligation as coastal States under the Convention.94 ) Pas-
sage of a ship would be "prejudicial to the peace, good order or se-
90. Id. These two provisions correspond to Articles 5 and 2, respectively, of the South
Pacific NWFZ Treaty. Supra note 14. See infra notes 141-69 and accompanying text.
91. Press Release of Aug. 7, 1985, supra note 15, at 2; South Pacific NWFZ Treaty, supra
note 14, Annex I, at 8.
92. Territorial waters are established by the coastal State "up to a limit of not exceeding
12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention."
UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 3. Article 17 ensures the right of innocent passage through a
nation's territorial seas.
93. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 19. For a more complete discussion of innocent
passage, see SMITH, supra note 74, at 20.
94. The nations in the South Pacific Forum are islands. Article 121 of UNCLOS III
states:
[T]he territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the con-
tinental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention applicable to other land territory.
UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 121. This Article also defines an "island" as "a naturally
formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide." Id. See also C.R.
SYMMONS, THE MARITIME ZONES OF ISLANDS IN INTERNAITONAL LAW (1979).
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curity" of a Forum Member State, if the ship, while in the territorial
sea of the State, engages in any one of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; [or]
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military
device.
95
A warship armed with nuclear weapons arguably has no right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea, if it is engaging in "exer-
cise or practice" with nuclear weapons or if, by its presence, it could
be perceived by the island State as maintaining a threat of force
against its sovereignty and territorial integrity and in fact does pres-
ent such a threat. 96 As a result, the South Pacific signatories to UN-
CLOS III have the legal right to challenge the passage of nuclear-
armed warships through their territorial waters, when UNCLOS III
enters into force. 97 Inasmuch as these provisions on innocent pas-
sage codify customary international law, the South Pacific States al-
95. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 19. See also id., art. 301, which states:
Article 301
Peaceful Uses of the Sea
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States
Parties shall refrain from any treaty or use of force against the territorial sovereignty
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
96. But see Nakamura, The Passage Through the Territorial Sea of Foreign Warships Car-
rying Nuclear Weapons, 25 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 1 (1982). See also W. BURKE, TOWARDS A
BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 1969); LAW
OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, LAW OF THE SEA: NEGLECTED
ISsUES 325-423 (1979).
The opposing argument would be that the exercise and passage of warships, nuclear-armed
or otherwise, is necessary to preserve the security of the South Pacific region, which ANZUS
obligates its parties to do. See infra notes 111-28. In addition, UNCLOS III does not allow for
a subjective perception of a threat to rule out innocent passage. See supra notes 94-95. On the
other hand, the determination that the passage of nuclear-armed warships is non-innocent
would be a decision made by multi-lateral agreement of all South Pacific nations. These na-
tions have also agreed by treaty that the security of the region is better served by keeping
nuclear weapons out. Moreover, the carriage and deployment of nuclear weapons by any
transportation medium presents an objective threat of massive annihilation as well. It is unfor-
tunate that the NWFZ Treaty only addresses surface deployment. Nuclear-armed submarines
probably pose a greater threat.
97. For an analysis of the effect of the decision of the United States and 22 other countries
not to sign UNCLOS III, see Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 541 (1983). The United States objections are based on the deep-sea mining provisions
and the procedure for amendment. Recent Developments, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 23
HARV. INT'L L.J., at 463, 464 (1983). In September 1982 the United States, France, Britain
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ready have the customary right to challenge such passage."
However, one provision of UNCLOS III could be interpreted as
allowing for innocent passage of a nuclear-armed ship through terri-
torial water.
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other
inherently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry docu-
ments and observe special precautionary measures established for
such ships by international agreements.99
The emphasized portion indicates that UNCLOS III contemplates
"foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear. . . sub-
stances" as being capable of innocent passage through territorial wa-
ters. " This phrase could be interpreted as including the concept of
ships carrying nuclear arms.
The more plausible interpretation is that the phrase "foreign nu-
clear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently
dangerous . . . substances" refers to a category of potentially tor-
tious maritime transportation quite different from the passage of war-
ships carrying nuclear weapons.' 0 ' An opposing position would be
that UNCLOS III contemplates nuclear-armed ships as ships carry-
ing a "nuclear substance," which would have a right of innocent pas-
sage through territorial waters, provided they "carry documents and
observe special precautionary measures. . . .. "' The NWFZ Par-
ties' position should be that nuclear-armed warships are "prejudicial
and West Germany signed an "interim arrangement" which is almost a "mini-treaty rival to
the UN Convention." Id.
As of July 1983 only six countries of the 168 States participating in UNCLOS III had
ratified the Convention. Article 308 requires 60 instruments of ratification or accession before
the Convention enters into force. Platzoeder, Who Will Ratify the Convention? 17 L. SEA IN-
STIT. PROC. 662-67 (1984). For a more general discussion, see KNIGHT, CONSEQUENCES OF
NON-AGREEMENT AT THE THIRD U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE (Am. Soc. Int. Law
and Policy No. I1, 1976).
98. See MacRae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea
Treaty, 13 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 181 (1983). See also Gamble, supra note 71, at 305; Howard,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy,
16 TEX, INT'L L.J. 321 (1981); Chessman, Treaties and Custom: A Commentary on the Draft
Restatement, 18 INT'L LAW 421 (1984); Oxman, Customary International Law in the Absence
of Widespread Ratification of the UN. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 17 L. SEA INSTIT.
PROC. 168-80 (1984).
99. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 23 (emphasis added).
100. See Zedalis, "Peaceful Purposes" and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised Compos-
ite Negotiating Text. A Comparative Analysis of the Existing and the Proposed Military Regime
for the High Seas, 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 1 (1979).
101. UNCLOS Ill, supra note 20, art. 23.
102. Id.
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to the peace, good order [and] security" of the entire region in the
form of a direct threat of massive destruction and thus are excluded
by the UNCLOS III provision defining "innocent passage."'
' 0 3
UNCLOS III also provides that "the coastal State may take the
necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not
innocent.""°4 The institution of a NWFZ is a necessary step to pre-
vent non-innocent passage of a foreign nuclear-armed warship
through territorial waters and the concurrent threat to regional se-
curity and survival."0 5
UNCLOS III defines "warship"" 6 and states: "If any warship
does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any re-
quest for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately."' 17
In summary, the Parties to the South Pacific NWFZ have the
legal right, under UNCLOS III, to exclude nuclear-armed warships
from their territorial waters by regional agreement.' 0 8 This right is
based on the argument that the passage of nuclear-armed warships
through territorial waters is per se non-innocent, that such passage is
"prejudicial to the peace, good order [and] security" of the entire
region."° The argument that such passage is non-innocent is in turn
103. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
104. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 25. See also id. art. 24.
105. The South Pacific parties would assert that a NWFZ is necessary to keep nuclear
weapons out of the region. This Zone, established on the basis of a valid treaty whose provi-
sions present no actual conflict with the parties' existing legal obligations (vis-a-vis UNCLOS
III and ANZUS), will depend for its practical effectiveness on the respect and recognition it
receives from the nuclear powers whose nuclear-armed warships now traverse the Zone. This
recognition through protocol is necessary. The Zone cannot be enforced by coercive measures,
since the nuclear weapons, against which the Zone is directed, are the ultimate coercive force
developed by human technology.
106. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 29.
107. Id. art. 30.
108. See supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text; cf McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note
73, at 130-36, 174-304, and 482-85. "It is ...reasonable to concede to a State the right to
enact regulations regarding the passage of foreign warships through its territorial waters, if
considerations based on its safety and protection justify it." Janis, Dispute Settlement in the
Law of the Sea Convention: The Military Activities Exception, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 51, 54
(1977), quoting C. JOHN COLOMoos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 223 (4th ed.,
1961).
For an argument that a State may not exclude a nuclear-armed warship from its territorial
waters (in a different context) on the grounds that its passage is non-innocent, see Nakamura,
supra note 96, at 6. Nakamura states: "It would seem that in international law the coastal
State is not granted the right to hamper the passage through its territorial sea beforehand on
grounds of a risk of radioactive pollution and suspected carriage of nuclear weapons."
109. See supra notes 94-96, 103, 105 and accompanying text.
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based on the fact that the presence of nuclear weapons in the region
increases the unacceptable risk that the weapons would be used.' " 0
A second international convention establishing obligations
which may conflict with obligations established by the NWFZ Treaty
is ANZUS.
B. ANZUS11'
The Preamble to ANZUS states:
The Parties to this Treaty,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so
that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of
them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense
for the preservation of peace and security pending the development
of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific
Area,
Therefore declare [the provisions of this Treaty] ... .
ANZUS states the procedure to follow if an armed attack on the
Parties occurs, outlines the Treaty area of coverage, and provides for
a Council to implement the Treaty.' 3Australia and New Zealand
can assert that a NWFZ in fact is "a more comprehensive system of
regional security," provided that the United States gives its support
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. However, an additional fact is that the
intercontinental range of nuclear missiles on board foreign warships would deride any exclu-
sion of such weapons from a regional boundary. Thus, ultimately, the South Pacific NWFZ
will have practical effect only as an unambiguous communication to the nuclear States that the
Forum States do not want such weapons in the region. New Zealand Prime Minister Lange,
for example, maintains no illusions about the range of strategic nuclear weapons or the "going
down with the ship" factor were even a small percentage of current arsenals of such weapons
unleashed, whether by computer error, human miscalculation, or terrorist design.
111. ANZUS, supra note 21. The members of ANZUS meet annually to discuss
developments in Asia and the Pacific. Although the agreement has served "primarily as a
vehicle for political consultation," there is a history of mutual support in armed conflict.
Australia and New Zealand both sent troops to support the U.S. military activity in Korea and
in Vietnam. L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at 17, col. i.
Prime Minister Lange of New Zealand states:
New Zealand is committed to the ANZUS Alliance. So too is the United States, as
the President himself has made clear. That treaty reflects, not the narrow question of
which particular American ships visit our ports, but the total commitment of our
people, Americans, Australians and New Zealanders, to keep the Pacific an area of
freedom, stability and peace.
Statement by the Prime Minister of New Zealand, David Lange, in Los Angeles (Feb. 26,
1985). [hereinafter cited as Lange, ANZUS Statement]. (Copy on file with the California
Western International Law Journal.)
112. ANZUS, supra note 21, Preamble (emphasis added).
113. Id. arts. 4, 5, & 7.
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to this arrangement. 4 These Parties can also maintain that ANZUS
is outdated, contemplates only conventional defensive forces, and
arose out of a geopolitical situation which has evolved considerably
and which demands a unique contemporary response." 5
The purpose of ANZUS is the collective security of the re-
gion. 116 This purpose is enhanced by the imposition of a NWFZ in
the region because, in theory, no nuclear weapons could enter and
none could be built within the Zone."I7 Such a Zone must of course
be verifiable with respect to all nuclear States.
ANZUS provides:
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."l
8
114. At the 1975 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, most experts noted as an
essential principle that "any arrangements for the establishment of a zone must provide for
appropriate guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against members of the zone." CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 32.
However, other representatives pointed out that "while such undertakings would contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of a Zone, they should not be considered a prerequisite for the establish-
ment" of a NWFZ, but should instead be considered on an ad hoc basis. CCD Special Report,
supra note 5, at 32 (emphasis added).
115. A long history of mutual involvement in trade, a shared democratic tradition and
comradeship in war produced one . . . association-the security alliance we call
ANZUS. For a third of a century, from the days when the perceived threat was
different and the alliance was clearly a conventional defensive association, we have
shared a commitment to the protection of the Pacific. We are not about to turn our
backs on long standing friendships because of our nuclear policies.
Address by the New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, to the Foreign Policy Association
in New York (Sept. 24, 1984) (hereinafter cited as Lange, Foreign Policy Address] (copy on file
with the California Western International Law Journal).
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117. The purpose of collective security can be completely fulfilled only with mutual and
verifiable assurances from the nuclear States in the form of legal obligations undertaken, to
observe and respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone.
Prime Minister Lange states:
We form no part of the Western nuclear deterrent. Unlike NATO, the ANZUS alli-
ance has in the past been regarded by the treaty partners as a conventional alliance
not a nuclear alliance. . .We believe it is in the interest of the South Pacific and the
Western alliances as a whole that the South Pacific not become part of a nuclear
confrontation.
Lange, ANZUS Statement, supra note Il1.
In the 1975 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, several participants agreed
that "a non-nuclear-weapon State allied to a nuclear-weapon State can ... also be a party to a
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty." Those delegates also pointed out that "such alliances should
not be regarded as being in all cases competitive with" NWFZs but could be complementary to
the effectiveness of a NWFZ. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 33.
118. ANZUS, supra note 21, art. 1.
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This vague but important language raises no express legal obligations
with which the obligations established by the NWFZ Treaty would
conflict. Australia and New Zealand may, in fact, assert that the
United States has breached its duty "to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force," by endangering the region
with the transport of nuclear weapons and by a genocidal foreign
policy of nuclear deterrence. The goals and correlative obligations of
ANZUS and of a NWFZ treaty are identical-to maintain the collec-
tive security of the region.119
ANZUS further provides that "[i]n order more effectively to
achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly
by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack."' 120 The NWFZ is just such a means of "self-help" in
response to an increasingly dangerous world in which "nuclear weap-
ons that may have helped to maintain an uneasy peace between two
great countries for more than three decades have become a threat to
the security and survival of countries and peoples everywhere."'
121
119. See supra note 117. The United States could, in turn, contend that the presence of
nuclear weapons in the South Pacific presents no reasonable threat of force against Australia or
New Zealand, who are allies, and that the purpose of the nuclear presence is for deterrence only
and that this presence is necessary to balance the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons. The
United States could further point out that if a South Pacific NWFZ were employed and the
East/West strategic balance of power were not changed by the existence of the NWFZ, there
could be no guarantees that the Soviets would honor any commitment in signing a protocol
agreement to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the South Pacific Zone. The NWFZ
proponents could counter that there are never any guarantees, and that peaceful and construc-
tive international relations must be based on trust, supported by mutual and verifiable assur-
ances of compliance (such as inspections authorized by a regional supervisory agency or a
comprehensive monitoring system).
The New Zealand position, vis-a-vis ANZUS, the domestic NWFZ in New Zealand, and
the South Pacific NWFZ is as follows:
We do not ask, we do not expect, the United States to come to New Zealand's assist-
ance with nuclear weapons or to present American nuclear capability as a deterrent
to an attacker. We do not wish to have nuclear weapons on New Zealand soil or in
our harbors. As an inescapable consequence, we have had to tell [the U.S.] Adminis-
tration that we will provide access to our ports only to vessels that are demonstrably
conventionally armed. By doing this we are expressing the commitment of New Zea-
landers to a nuclear-free New Zealand.
• . . Once in place, the zone will help keep the South Pacific free, as it is now, of
strategic confrontation. This is a very great contribution to security in the region and
to global peace. It is also in full conformity with the ANZUS Treaty and with the
spirit of that treaty where it talks of "strengthening the fabric of peace" in the Pacific.
Lange, ANZUS Statement, supra note I 1l. See also supra notes 1-2, 4, and 6-7. But cf Alves,
Tiff With New Zealand Imperils Pacific Security, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1985, at 19. Alves ad-
dresses the Soviet military presence in the Pacific.
120. ANZUS, supra note 21, art. 2 (emphasis added).
121. Lange, UN General Assembly Address, supra note 1. Complicating the issue is the
fact that the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet has grown by 30% in recent years. The United States
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Further evidence of the out-moded nature of ANZUS is the fact
that there is no "individual and collective capacity" to resist nuclear
attack, except by building nuclear weapons, which is contrary to obli-
gations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the official policy of
the South Pacific States.1 22 Furthermore, building nuclear weapons
is not an effective defense to nuclear attack but is merely an assur-
ance of the opponent's mutual annihilation.
23
An additional obligation under ANZUS is for the Parties to
"consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territo-
rial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties
is threatened in the Pacific."' 24 This consultation is in progress.12
In conclusion, ANZUS does not establish any express legal obli-
gations which would conflict with Australia's and New Zealand's ob-
ligations established by the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty. Critics of
the NWFZ contend that such a zone violates the "spirit" of ANZUS,
because the United States nuclear warships are instruments for the
defense of the Pacific region.126 However, ANZUS does not provide
for nuclear retaliation in support of the alliance, nor does it include
by its terms the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the
Department of State has maintained that a South Pacific NWFZ "would destabilize regional
security." Taft, supra note 6; The Kiwi Disease, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1984, at 20, col. 1.; Alves,
supra note 119. According to Article 2 of the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty, supra note 14, the
Zone would have no effect on oceanic travel by conventionally armed warships. The strategic
balance of power would be maintained since it would be nuclear weapons of all States that
would be excluded, with verification mechanisms established by protocol. Article 2 states:
"Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in anyway affect the rights or the exercise of the
rights of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the Seas."
122. Lange, U.N. General Assembly Address, supra note I. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
states:
Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indi-
rectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device.
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 11, art. II.
123. See DUNN, supra note 76; THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND
SECURITY ISSUES, supra note 59; EPSTEIN, LAST CHANCE, supra note 5.
124. ANZUS, supra note 21, art. 3.
125. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
126. That Washington expressed its opposition to the South Pacific NWFZ proposals
(particularly in 1974 and 1975) directly to New Zealand as well as within the ANZUS
setting, is an established fact. Thus opponents have maintained such proposals are
basically incompatible with ANZUS. So long as member governments perceive their
security interests as linked to the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific
and a U.S. position of deterrence, the essential political will for NWFZ formation will
not be forthcoming.
ALLEY, supra note 4, at 38.
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allies. 127 Thus, the literal terms of ANZUS do not raise obligations
which conflict with obligations under the NWFZ Treaty.12
III. PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING POTENTIAL CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE SIGNATORIES' LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE SOUTH PACIFIC NWFZ TREATY
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
A. Re-negotiation of ANZUS
A primary key to the effectiveness of the South Pacific NWFZ is
the support and respect for the Zone by the United States. For a
NWFZ to succeed, the United States and its allies have set forth four
requirements: (1) that the establishment of a NWFZ not upset the
existing military balance; (2) that the NWFZ be initiated by those
States in the region of the Zone; (3) that the NWFZ include all the
States in the area if feasible, or at least those with significant military
power; and (4) that the Zone be subject to verification to ensure that
it remains nuclear-weapon-free.129 These four elements should be ad-
dressed in detail by the South Pacific Parties to the NWFZ Treaty.
Since support from the United States for the NWFZ is uncer-
tain, ANZUS should be carefully re-negotiated to accommodate both
the existence of the South Pacific NWFZ and the concern for deter-
ring any regional threat of potential Soviet aggression.
The Labour Party, the majority party in New Zealand, has al-
ready proposed this re-negotiation of ANZUS "for the purpose of
ensuring the economic, social and political stability of the South East
Asian and Pacific regions."13° The Labour Party platform presents
requirements for re-negotiation as an indication of official policy:
127. New Zealand has already made this point. See supra notes 117, 119 and accompany-
ing text.
128. CCD Special Report, supra note 5, at 33.
Most experts expressed the view that if a State included in a nuclear-weapon-free
zone is a member of a security alliance, the membership of that alliance cannot justify
any exceptions to the obligations arising from the nuclear-weapon-free zone
agreement.
Id. at 34.
129. EPSTEIN, AFRICA, supra note 22, at 6. Epstein points out elsewhere that the United
States and its allies are concerned that any reduction of United States military power would
give military or political advantage to the Soviet Union. Epstein, ScI. AM., supra note 22, at
26-27.
130. ELECTION '84 POLICIES, supra note 6, at 2. "Our policies are not anti-ally; they are
not anti-alliance; they are anti-nuclear. They arise from deeply-felt sentiments held by a major-
ity of our people." Lange, Foreign Policy Address, supra note 115.
'1986
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[T]he basic requirements of such an updated agreement should be:
(a) New Zealand's unconditional anti-nuclear stance;
(b) the active promotion of a nuclear weapons free South
Pacific;
(c) the acceptance of absolutely equal partnership on all is-
sues handled within the terms of the agreement and unanimous
agreement on all decisions taken under those terms; [and]
(d) an absolute guarantee of the complete integrity of New
Zealand's sovereignty.13
The re-negotiation of ANZUS must address the shared goals of all
Parties, as well as the collective security of the Pacific region. Aus-
tralia and New Zealand must assert that the South Pacific NWFZ,
strengthened by the support of the United States, is a safer and more
effective method of assuring the security of the region than is the
nuclear militarization of the South Pacific.
1 32
Because of the Parties' differing perceptions of their obligations,
ANZUS should be re-negotiated to accommodate the conflicting pol-
icies. The re-negotiation would reconcile the existence of a viable
and effective South Pacific NWFZ with the goals and policies of the
United States regarding national security and deterrence of interna-
tional conflict.
B UNCLOS III: Ratification and Amendment
1. Ratification. Those members of the South Pacific Forum
who have not ratified UNCLOS III should do so immediately. It is
in the best interests of the South Pacific States that UNCLOS III
enter into force as soon as possible. Therefore, the NWFZ Parties
should also actively work through the United Nations and all avail-
able diplomatic channels to urge all UNCLOS III signatories to rat-
ify the Convention at the earliest opportunity. Forty-seven more
States must ratify or accede to UNCLOS III before it enters into
131. ELECTION '84 POLICIES, supra note 6, at 2. See also Lange, Foreign Policy Address,
supra note 115. However, there is no indication that the election platform is now governmental
policy. Official policy is to maintain ANZUS in its present form. The problem, according to
the New Zealand government, is not the terms of the Treaty itself, but the differing interpreta-
tions of those terms and of the obligations which the terms create. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
Re-negotiation of ANZUS would involve, at least, reconciling the different interpretations
and solidifying the exact nature of the obligations. Re-negotiation, at most, would involve
drafting a new treaty to manifest the Alliance, in the context of both the South Pacific NWFZ
and the United States' modern security interests.
132. ALLEY, supra note 4, at 40-45.
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force. 133
When UNCLOS III enters into force, the NWFZ Parties' obli-
gations under this Convention will be established. Until the entry
into force of UNCLOS III, arguments for the South Pacific NWFZ
must be based primarily on customary international law of the sea,
which is less certain and more open to question or challenge.
When UNCLOS III enters into force and the Parties begin fol-
lowing its provisions, those provisions of the Convention which do
not codify customary law begin the transformation into customary
law, which is binding on third-Party States.1
34
2. Amendment. After UNCLOS III has entered into force, an
amendment should be composed to provide specifically for the exist-
ence of the South Pacific NWFZ. Such an amendment must be pro-
posed by written communication to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, who will in turn circulate the proposal among all
States Parties. 1
35
The amendment should be drafted in anticipation of the neces-
sity for unanimous approval and should include:
(a) an explicit clarification of the "peaceful purposes" phrase in
the Convention to exclude by its meaning the practice or maneuvers
by nuclear-armed warships within the area prescribed by the South
Pacific NWFZ.136 The term "peaceful purposes" should be modified
to read "purposes not involving the possession or deployment of nu-
clear weapons;"'
' 37
(b) procedure for verification of compliance with the nuclear-
weapon-free status of the South Pacific Zone, including the documen-
tation of Protocol agreements, similar to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
and remedial recourse to the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea;
(c) the requirement of a periodic re-confirmation of the NWFZ
by the UN General Assembly;
(d) an internationally valid definition of the NWFZ concept.
Such a definition should refer to the NWFZ as a regional security
arrangement in the common interest and should exclude possible
misinterpretation of the Zone as a transnational extension of territo-
133. See supra notes 20, 97 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 313. If one State Party were to object to the pro-
posed amendment within a twelve month period the amendment would be considered rejected.
136. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss1/13
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
rial sovereignty. 138 Such a definition should clarify that the sole pur-
pose of the NWFZ is to eliminate a massive threat to regional peace,
security, and survival by excluding nuclear weapons from a defined
area; 39 and
(e) a mechanism for observance of the NWFZ by all nuclear
States sponsoring military maneuvers involving nuclear weapons
near the boundary of the zone."'
This Comment will next analyze the possibilities for extending
the South Pacific NWFZ within international legal limits, to increase
the Zone's effectiveness.
IV. PROPOSALS TO EXPAND THE SOUTH PACIFIC NWFZ
WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIMITS
The NWFZ Treaty as presently drafted contains two major pro-
visions which, although making ratification by the South Pacific
States likely, may seriously reduce the Zone's effectiveness. These
two provisions are (1) a blanket preservation of the freedom of navi-
gation and (2) the reservation of the right of each sovereign Member
State to decide for itself which ships may or may not enter its territo-
rial waters. 14l
The practical result of these provisions may be that the Zone
will be non-existent beyond the signatories' territorial waters, since
nuclear-armed warships would retain the freedom of navigation
guaranteed by customary international law the NWFZ would be ef-
fective in territorial waters only if the signatory adopts nuclear-
weapon-free policy.
As already demonstrated the obligations established by the
South Pacific NWFZ Treaty are consistent with obligations estab-
138. Alfonso Garcia Robles, the chief author of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has recommended
that the highest priority be given to the formulation of an internationally valid definition of a
NWFZ. ALLEY, supra note 4, at 31.
139. See supra notes 94-96, 105, 109-10 and accompanying text. See infra note 165 and
accompanying text.
140. Gaining the recognition of the NWFZ by the nuclear States and their pledges to re-
spect its nuclear-weapon-free status, while not a sine qua non for its existence, is important for
the effectiveness of the zone. As Epstein points out:
(The establishment of NWFZs] would be facilitated if the nuclear powers would
demonstrate their wholehearted support for the creation of such zones not only as a
means of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons but also as a way of fur-
thering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (though the establishment of large-scale
regional nuclear-fuel recycling centers within NWFZs) and of providing security as-
surance to countries in the denuclearized zone.
Epstein, Sc. AM., supra note 22, at 35.
141. See supra note 90-92 and accompanying text.
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lished by UNCLOS III and ANZUS. The problem is that such con-
sistency may result in practical ineffectiveness of application. To be
effective, the South Pacific NWFZ must extend beyond territorial
water to the ocean space traditionally known as the "high seas."
UNCLOS III has reinforced the legal concept of "Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone," which may extend to 200 miles from a State's territo-
rial water. This Comment will next examine the potential conflicts
involved in extending the South Pacific NWFZ to the limits of the
Exclusive Economic Zones of each signatory and to the high seas.
1. The Exclusive Economic Zone. The Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) is "an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to the specific legal regime established" in UNCLOS 111.142
This Zone "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the base-
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."'
143
Experts have noted that the NWFZ must extend beyond the ter-
ritorial seas of the Parties to have any effect at all,'" since nuclear-
armed warships seldom pass through territorial waters. 145 Their pas-
sage is mainly conducted beyond the territorial waters, in the ocean
space traditionally known as the "high seas."'
' 46
142. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 55. For a more comprehensive discussion of EEZs
see Fleischer, The Exclusive Economic Zone Under the Convention and in State Practice, 17 L.
SEA INST. PROC. 241-86 (1984).
143. Id. art. 57. It has been estimated that in the South Pacific "the national jurisdiction
covered by the new 200-mile EEZs approaches 20 million square nautical miles." Krueger &
Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic zone: State Practice in the Pacific
Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321 (1979-80). Krueger & Nordquist state that "the establishment of
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the most significant development in ocean laws
since the articulation of the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas." Id.
144. Interview with Professor S. Houston Lay, Professor Emeritus, California Western
School of Law, in San Diego, California (Jan. 23, 1985).
According to Roderic Alley, critics of the South Pacific NWFZ would argue that the
"zonal agreement would be most easily maintained where it was least likely to be breached,
while it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce when enforcement would be most
needed." ALLEY, supra note 4, at 36.
145. ALLEY, supra note 4, at 48.
146. See infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text. Under the UNCLOS III regime, the
"high seas" are "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipe-
lagic State." UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 86. Article 58 provides that the Article 87
freedom of the high seas is available to all other States in passing through the EEZs. Some
commentators are concerned that the 200-mile EEZs will, eventually "creep" into the status of
territorial waters and therefore severely limit navigational rights. Although the United States
announced its willingness to accept 200-mile EEZs at Caracas in 1974, the Chief of the U.S.
Delegation, John R. Stevenson, made it clear that this was conditional on the protection of
transit rights through the EEZ. Janis, supra note 108, at 60; Cundick, International Straits:
The Right of Access, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107 (1975); Booth, Historic Compromise or
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In the EEZ, the island State has "sovereign rights" for the pur-
pose of exploring, conserving, and managing the natural resources of
the waters, seabed, and its subsoil in that area.
147
With regard to the rights and obligations of other States in the
EEZ, UNCLOS III provides:
In the exclusive economic zone, the States, whether coastal or
land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Con-
vention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of the navigation
and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, air-
craft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the
other provisions of this Convention.
148
The "freedoms referred to in article 87" are the freedoms of the high
seas.'49 In the context of a NWFZ, the applicable freedom is the
freedom of navigation.
The South Pacific Parties would have a collective right to re-
strict the non-innocent passage of nuclear-armed warships through
the EEZ of each Party, if such passage is not an "internationally law-
ful" use of the sea under Article 87. t5
Given the specific rights and duties of the coastal State in the
EEZ as provided in UNCLOS III, extending the South Pacific
NWFZ into the EEZ would conflict with the rights guaranteed to
other States by UNCLOS III unless the passage of foreign nuclear-
Paradigm Shift? Naval Mobility Versus Creeping Jurisdiction in the 1982 UN. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 17 L. SEA INSTIT. PROC. 312-35 (1984).
Under UNCLOS III, each coastal State or island is authorized to establish, at maximum, a
12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ (which would include the territorial sea and the 24-
mile contiguous zone). The enormity of areas covered by the EEZs is of particular importance
in the South Pacific.
For example, Tonga can claim 173,800 square nautical miles which is 640 times its
land area (270 square miles); Fiji can claim 330,000 square nautical miles which is
about 400 times its land area (7,055 square miles); Western Samoa can claim 28,000
square nautical miles which is 25 times its land area (1,133 square miles); [and] Na-
uru 125,700 square nautical miles which is 15,700 times its land area (8 square
miles). ....
Lee, supra note 82, at 248 and 262.
147. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 56. "[S]afety zones in which navigation might be
restricted or prohibited could be established for installations located in economic zone (such
zones are already permitted by art. 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf)". KNIGHT,
supra note 97, at 52.
148. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 58 (emphasis added).
149. See generally THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES AND ZONES (L. Alex-
ander ed. 1967).
150. See Vindenes, The Environmental Rights of Coastal States and the Freedom of Naviga-
tion, 17 L. SEA INSTIT. PROC. 574-83 (1984). See also supra note 77 and accompanying text for
arguments supporting the international illegality of nuclear weapons.
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armed warships through the economic zone is found to be interna-
tionally illegal. 5
An additional option is to extend the South Pacific NWFZ be-
yond the theoretical boundary of the EEZ to the high seas. An ex-
tension of the NWFZ to the high seas could create serious conflict
with both UNCLOS III and customary international law of the
sea.' 52 However, the conflict with UNCLOS III is surmountable.
3. The High Seas. The high seas are defined in UNCLOS III
as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State,
or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State."'5 3
UNCLOS III provides that the high seas are open to all States,
whether coastal, island, or landlocked. "Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for
coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; [and] (b)
freedom of overflight. . . ' UNCLOS III further provides that
"these freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas and also with due regard for the rights under this Conven-
151. But see McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 73, at 565-627, 730-78.
It is not to be inferred that this widespread acceptance of the general doctrine pre-
scribing freedom of access for navigation absolutely prohibits any activity or author-
ity which may interfere with such freedom. To the contrary, States commonly make
certain claims to exclusive use and authority, interfering with inclusive use, which are
recognized by the general community to be consistent with international law ...
Naval operations at sea during times of peace are the most common form of exclusive
use considered to be in accord with international law. . . .Exercises involving the
use of modern weapons could not be conducted with safety except in relatively unfre-
quented areas .. . [T]he most relevant standard prescribed by customary interna-
tional law is that of reasonableness.
Id. at 768-72.
152. See infra notes 153-168 and accompanying text. UNCLOS III embodies the custom-
ary principle that all States have freedom of navigation on the high seas. See infra note 154 and
accompanying text. The NWFZ proponents would contend that this freedom should be sub-
ject to restriction where the navigator is carrying nuclear weapons that jeopardize regional
survival and security. They would demonstrate that the threat comes from the nuclear weap-
ons themselves, not necessarily those in whose hands (or by whose computers) they are con-
trolled. The danger derives from the risk of miscalculation, accident or human error. Such a
risk increases in proportion to the proliferation of the weapons and the frequency of their
brandishment. The NWFZ parties would emphasize that the Zone would only exclude nuclear
weapons. Military exercises with conventional weapons would still be an appropriate use of the
high seas. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
153. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 86.
154. Id. art. 87. See also W. BURKE, R. LEGATSKI, & W. WOODHEAD, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE OCEAN 88-110 (1975).
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tion with respect to activities in the Area."'' 5 5
In addition, UNCLOS III states that "the high seas shall be re-
served for peaceful purposes." 5 6 Were the NWFZ to extend beyond
the EEZ, the Parties would contend that the term "peaceful pur-
poses" means "non-warlike," and therefore "non-military," activity.
This meaning is consonant with the traditional construction of the
term "peaceful purposes" in the Antarctic Treaty,' 57 the Outer Space
Treaty, 5 8 and the Sea-bed Treaty. 59 The traversing of the South
Pacific high seas by nuclear-armed warships is an inherently war-like
activity and is a threat to regional security. It is illogical to construe
such activity as peaceful." 6° Peace through strength will not occur
through superiority.
If the term "peaceful purposes" is interpreted as "non-military
purposes," then Article 88 of UNCLOS III would prohibit nuclear-
armed warships from practicing on the high seas, and would be con-
sistent with UNCLOS 111.161 The expanded NWFZ would also be
consistent with UNCLOS III if the term "peaceful purposes" were
more restrictively defined as "purposes not involving the possession
155. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 87.
156. Id. art. 88 (emphasis added).
157. The interpretation of the term "peaceful purposes" as denying any military use of the
high seas is consistent with the common interpretation of the same term in Article 1 of the
Antarctic Treaty. See supra notes 46, 48-49 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. See also Dore, International Law and
the Preservation of the Ocean Space and Outer Space as Zones of Peace. Progress and Problems,
15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1982) for an analysis of the "peaceful purposes" ambiguity.
160. For an argument that the term "peaceful purposes" should be interpreted as including
military activity, see Zedalis, supra note 100, at 19. Zedalis defines the distinction:
[I]f only non-military uses are permitted, then the high seas may not be employed for
any activity of a military nature, including the navigation of warships. On the other
hand, if "peaceful purposes" simply prescribes a non-aggressive standard, then the
high seas may legally be used for a whole host of activities of a military nature as long
as none of the activities are aggressive.
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
Zedalis subscribes to the interpretation of "peaceful purposes" which allows for military
activity and argues that "the inescapable conclusion is that it establishes a nonagressive norma-
tive standard." Id.
The most widely acknowledged unstated use of the High Seas presently recognized by
the general principles of international law is the right of all states to employ the high
seas for military purposes. Military vessels are undoubtedly entitled to traverse the
waters of the high seas pursuant to the freedom of navigation.
Id. at 12. "This freedom is not restricted and in fact [UNCLOS III] contemplates navigation
by military as well as civilian vessels. Such use, however, would be clearly inconsistent with a
non-military standard." Id. at 19.
161. Such an interpretation could be made by the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, or any other decision-making entity with authority to interpret UNCLOS III.
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or deployment of nuclear weapons. '
According to UNCLOS III, "no State may validly purport to
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty."' 163 Critics might
contend that the South Pacific Parties are violating this provision.'64
However, this contention would be based on misunderstanding. Es-
tablishing the South Pacific NWFZ is not an exercise of sovereignty.
It is preventive self-defense and transcends the traditional concept of
sovereignty as territorial control by a single State. The purposes of
the Zone are to acheive regional security, the prevention of further
nuclear-arms proliferation, and the avoidance of catastrophic nuclear
confrontation.1 6 ' The provision also refers to "no State" in the sin-
gular form. Not only is no extension of sovereignty involved, since
the only control asserted is to exclude weapons of mass destruction,
but also the establishment of the expanded NWFZ would be under-
taken by a group of States in multilateral pursuance of their mutual
primal value of regional survival.
UNCLOS III further provides that "warships on the high seas
have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than
the flag State."' 16 6 This provision could be interpreted as contemplat-
ing the presence of warships on the high seas.
167
However, this provision does not contradict a construction of
the term "peaceful purposes" as "purposes not involving the posses-
sion, deployment or testing of nuclear weapons."' 6 1 South Pacific
NWFZ proponents make clear that no territorial "jurisdiction" is be-
ing claimed in the establishment of the NWFZ. In addition, the pro-
vision again refers to "any State" in the singular. The NWFZ was
established as a regional agreement, based on common sense, regional
security, and multi-lateral reciprocity, to exclude nuclear weapons
within a defined area and is an assertion of neither jurisdiction nor
sovereignty.
162. A contrary position could be that either construction contradicts the common practice
of the nuclear States, as well as the customary principle of international law that military activ-
ity on the high seas is appropriate, acceptable, and indeed necessary to maintain a balance of
power, deter aggression, and present an allied defense. The NWFZ proponents would counter
that custom necessarily determines neither moral rightness nor legality. See also Alves, supra
note 119.
163. UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 89 (emphasis added).
164. See LIMITS TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA (G.T. Yates & G.D. Billock
eds. 1974).
165. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
166. UNCLOS 11, supra note 20, art. 95.
167. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the two options available for extending the Zone
are (1) to the limits of the EEZs of each Party and (2) to the high
seas. Since passage of nuclear-armed warships is "non-innocent,"
meaning "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security" of the
State, the NWFZ could exclude nuclear weapons from the Parties'
territorial waters under UNCLOS III. If possession and/or deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons is not an "internationally lawful" use of the
sea and passage of nuclear-armed warships is non-innocent, then the
NWFZ could be extended to the limits of the EEZ of each Party. If
the term "peaceful purposes" in Article 88 of UNCLOS III is con-
strued to mean either "non-military purposes" or "purposes not in-
volving the possession, deployment or testing of nuclear weapons,"
then the NWFZ could be extended to the high seas without conflict-
ing with the obligations of the South Pacific Parties under UNCLOS
III. However, since the reciprocal obligation of the nuclear States to
observe the nuclear-weapon free status of the South Pacific NWFZ is
essential to its effectiveness, it now seems unlikely, without some in-
spired diplomacy, that the Zone can be extended in practice beyond
the Parties' territorial waters. 1
69
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined two international conventions to
which South Pacific Forum members are Parties: the Third United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1I)170 and the
Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States (ANZUS).'' If the obligations established by the NWFZ
Treaty conflict with obligations under either of these two conven-
169. The arguments supporting the illegality of nuclear weapons under international law
serve to strengthen the proposition that the activity of nuclear-armed warships in traversing the
high seas is illegal. However, prevalent customary practice and other considerations (self-de-
fense, national security, maintaining balance of power) are given as rationales to contradict that
proposition. See Zedalis, supra note 100. See also SINGH, supra note 77; CARNEGIE ENDOW-
MENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, (1971); SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 1I,
at 185-219; THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT, supra note 76.
In view of the short term and the long term international instability which may be
generated by the militarization of outer space, the polar zones, or the oceans, it is
imperative that the prescriptions of international law affecting military utilization of
such areas be thoroughly examined in order to determine if adequate and effective
restrictions or limitations on such activities exist.
Zedalis, supra note 100, at 3.
170. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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tions, such conflict could render the NWFZ ineffective.1
72
Several proposals have been made in recent history to establish
NWFZs. Their lack of success can be attributed primarily to their
failure to address the strategic interests of the nuclear States.' 73 The
most successful NWFZ to date was established by the Latin-Ameri-
can Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967.174 Other NWFZs have been cre-
ated by the Outer Space Treaty,' 75 the Sea-bed Treaty, 76 and the
Antarctic Treaty.
77
For the South Pacific NWFZ to succeed, the Parties must con-
sider the interests of the nuclear States whose warships traverse the
region.
Under UNCLOS III, the NWFZ can be legally established in
the territorial waters of the parties. 78 Such a territorial NWFZ is
valid, since the passage of nuclear-armed warships is characterized as
"non-innocent" according to the terms of UNCLOS III.17 9
New Zealand and Australia are members of the 34-year-old
ANZUS defense alliance with the United States.'8 ° The South Pa-
cific NWFZ does not conflict with the express terms of ANZUS.' 8 '
However, there are differing perceptions among ANZUS Parties con-
cerning their obligations under the Treaty.'8 2 Since ANZUS is vital
to United States defense policy, as well as the military security of the
South Pacific, the Treaty should be re-negotiated to accommodate
the conflicting concerns.
8 3
Also, UNCLOS III should be ratified by all NWFZ Parties and
should be amended, when the Convention goes into effect, to allow
for the South Pacific NWFZ and for the establishment of future
NWFZs.
In addition to establishment in territorial waters, the NWFZ
could be extended to the limits of the EEZ of each Party, 184 if the
transport or possession of nuclear weapons in combat-ready status on
172. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 24, 49-59 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 21, 112-28 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
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a warship is illegal under international law. ' 5 Although there is a
strong argument for such illegality, 8 6 common usage contradicts a
classification of this activity as illegal. A finding that such activity
was illegal would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce but would
serve to consolidate world public opinion against the transport of nu-
clear weapons.
The NWFZ could also be extended to the high seas, under the
provisions of UNCLOS III, if the phrase "peaceful purposes" is de-
fined to mean "purposes not involving the possession or deployment
of nuclear weapons."'' Whether the South Pacific NWFZ will be
effective primarily depends on the decision of nuclear States engaged
in the area to abide by the restrictions imposed by the Zone. 8'
Some observers would maintain that the action of the South Pa-
cific Forum in drafting a NWFZ Treaty is a misguided response to a
Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation and a misperception of United
States military policy. To these critics one might respond that the
establishment of a NWFZ in the South Pacific is an intelligent reac-
tion to the unacceptable danger threatened by the deployment of nu-
clear weapons themselves, not a condemnation of those whose policy
their carriage is an instrument. The deployment and brandishment
of instruments of mass destruction is simply no part of the foreign
policy of those nations comprising the Forum. By sovereign action
they have mutually agreed on policy for their region and have opted
for the sane alternative of excluding nuclear weapons and their con-
current threat from the region. These island nations have taken a
courageous leadership role.
The South Pacific States have taken a step toward world peace.
The great nuclear Powers should take heed of their courage and de-
termination. The United States, in particular, has the moral respon-
sibility to conduct international relations without brandishing
weapons of mass destruction. To move beyond war, we must remove
the need to build the weapons.
In the words of the Right Honorable David Lange, the Prime
Minister of New Zealand:
The intention of those who for honorable motives use nuclear
weapons is to enhance security: They succeed only in enhancing
insecurity. The machine has perverted the motive.
185. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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The weapon has its own relentless logic, the logic of the arms
race. Nuclear weapons make us insecure, and to compensate for
our insecurity, we build and deploy more nuclear weapons. . . we
know that we are seized by irrationality, and yet we persist ....
In the South Pacific there is at this moment the chance to turn
away from the inhuman logic of nuclear weapons ...
There is no humanity in the logic that holds that my country
must be obliged to play host to nuclear weapons because others in
the West are playing host to nuclear weapons. That is the logic
that refuses to admit that there is any alternative to nuclear weap-
ons, when plainly there is.
It is self-defeating logic, just as the weapons themselves are
self-defeating: To compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons
against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of
totalitarianism.
The great strength of the West lies not in force of arms but in
its free and democratic systems of government. That is why, in
spite of all the difficulties New Zealand has got into with our
friends and allies, I am not disheartened.
Rejecting nuclear weapons is to assert what is human over the
evil nature of the weapon; it is to restore to humanity the power of
decision; it is to allow true moral force to reign supreme."9
P. Robert Philp, Jr.
189. Address by David Lange, Prime Minister, New Zealand, to the Oxford Union at Ox-
ford University in England (Mar. 1, 1985) (copy on file with the California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal).
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